Fair Allocation of Disputed Properties by Ju, Biung-Ghi & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Economics Department Working Paper Series Economics
2016
Fair Allocation of Disputed Properties
Biung-Ghi Ju
Department of Economics, Seoul National University, Korea
Juan D. Moreno-Ternero
Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Spain, and CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/econ_workingpaper
Part of the Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Economics Department Working Paper Series by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please
contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ju, Biung-Ghi and Moreno-Ternero, Juan D., "Fair Allocation of Disputed Properties" (2016). Economics Department Working Paper
Series. 209.
Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/econ_workingpaper/209
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
 
 
 
Working Paper 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
AMHERST 
 
Fair Allocation of Disputed 
Properties 
 
by 
 
Biung-Ghi Ju 
Juan D. Moreno-Ternero 
 
 
Working Paper 2016-10 
Fair Allocation of Disputed Properties⇤
Biung-Ghi Ju† Juan D. Moreno-Ternero‡
September 26, 2016
Abstract
Wemodel problems of allocating disputed properties as generalized exchange economies.
Therein, agents have preferences and claims over multiple goods, and the social endow-
ment of each good may not be su cient to satisfy all individual claims. We focus on
market-based allocation rules that impose a two-step procedure: assignment of rights
based on claims first, and voluntary exchange based on the assigned rights afterwards.
We characterize three focal egalitarian rights-assignment rules that guarantee that the
allocation rules are fair. We apply our results to problems of greenhouse gas emissions
and contested water rights.
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1 Introduction
Fairness and distributive justice are primary concerns in practical procedures for property rights
disputes. If a rule is not perceived as fair, its adoption might be jeopardized. Failures to agree
on a new international framework dealing with Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions after the
Kyoto protocol are a point in case. Countries at di↵erent stages of economic development
have di↵erent perceptions of fairness and support di↵erent rules. Closing the gap to reach
a final resolution is a political economy problem. However, the core issue is an ethical one
and investigating it from the perspective of normative economics will facilitate its political
resolution.
Resolving property rights disputes usually involves three general principles; namely, equal
division, proportional division, and equal sacrifice. Examples can be found in numerous institu-
tional setups (including laws, social, and religious norms) or agreed conventions (such as court
settlements for accident damages, or international resolutions on environmental problems). The
three principles also underlie the three prominent proposals for the allocation of GHG emission
rights. 1
The normative foundation of allocation schemes, such as the above three principles, has
been a key subject in the literature of fair allocation. Nevertheless, most studies in this lit-
erature either focus on allocating a single good (money) (e.g., O’Neill, 1982; Thomson, 2003,
2015), dismissing the issue of fair initial allocation and its influence on the final allocation of
the other goods after the subsequent interactions among claimants, or assume a fixed initial
distribution of property rights, without dispute, and investigate end-state fairness (e.g., Pazner
and Schmeidler, 1974; Thomson, 2011).2 Therefore, they are somewhat limited for the investi-
gation of (end-state and procedural) fairness in some environments with conflicting claims, or
property rights dispute.
We provide in this paper a comprehensive framework to investigate fairness in the initial
assignment of rights on disputed properties, fairness in the transaction of rights, and fairness of
the end-state allocation, as well as the implications of the three categories of fairness and their
relations. Our model is an extended model of exchange economies, the extension allowing for
1The proposal to allocate on an “equal per capita basis” (e.g., Neumayer, 2000) corresponds to equal division,
the polluter pays principle (paraphrased as “you broke it, you fix it”; e.g., Singer, 2002) to proportional division,
and the principle of equal burden sharing (e.g., Posner and Weisbach, 2010) to equal sacrifice.
2There exist generalizations of the rationing model introduced by O’Neill (1982) to a multidimensional
setting, but therein, even though claims refer to multiple types of assets, the endowment to be allocated is still
unidimensional (e.g., Ju, Miyagawa, and Sakai, 2007).
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conflicts over properties. More precisely, agents have preferences over a finite number of goods,
and they also have initial claims on those goods. Furthermore, the available endowment of each
good may not be su cient to satisfy all claims; i.e., the sum of individual claims exceeds the
endowment. In other words, we consider rationing problems with multiple goods where agents
can have various homogeneous or heterogeneous preferences over those goods.3
Our model is flexible enough to accommodate a variety of real-life problems involving prop-
erty rights disputes. A running interpretation of the model is as cap-and-trade systems to deal
with GHG emissions.4 For such an interpretation, agents should be considered as GHG-emitting
entities, goods as energy and money (with the latter being used to produce the former), claims
as their energy consumptions on a base year and their incomes, and the social endowment as
the targeted amount for total energy consumption, below the total energy consumption on a
base year, and the net total endowment of money after paying the cost of energy production.
Another interpretation of our model is as problems of contested water rights.5 In those
cases, water supply falls short of satisfying the regular amounts of water usage by the entities
who share a water source. There are two goods: water and money. Claims consist of the
amount of water used in a base year, and the monetary endowment. Here, dispute exists only
over the water rights, not over money.
Various forms of markets have been developed throughout human history. Two fundamental
elements encompassing them are private property rights and voluntary exchange.6 We precisely
define in our context market-based allocation rules as those rules determined by these two
elements, formalized in our model by the consecutive procedures of rights-assignment and
voluntary exchange. Our main results characterize market-based allocation rules that lead to
fair (and e cient) end-state allocations.
End-state fairness is formalized in this context as three variants of no-envy, probably the
concept with the longest tradition in the theory of fair allocation (e.g., Foley, 1967; Kolm,
1972; Varian, 1974).7 No-envy is satisfied if no agent prefers anyone else’s consumption to her
3This is the main di↵erence with respect to bankruptcy problems dealing with the allocation of a single good
(e.g., Thomson, 2003, 2015) where all agents are presumed to have the unique monotonic preferences over the
single good.
4The term is broadly used to describe a policy that sets caps on the emissions of (GHG-emitting) entities
and allows trading in the resulting emissions allowances (e.g., Stavins, 2008).
5A di↵erent analysis of these problems is Ansink and Weikard (2009).
6For instance, as Hodgson (2008, p.326) puts it, ‘Together these specifications (put forward by the Austrian
school economist Ludwig van Mises) amount to a definition of the market that embraces all forms of trade or
exchange that involve private property, defined loosely as assets under private control’. This view is also shared
by Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Friedrich Hayek, etc. (see Hodgson, 2008).
7It was also used in moral philosophy as a basic test for resource egalitarian allocations (e.g., Dworkin, 1981).
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own. A parallel comparative notion of fairness, defined through interpersonal comparisons of
(absolute) sacrifices gives rise to the notion of sacrifice-no-envy. Likewise, we define relative-
no-envy through interpersonal comparison of relative sacrifices (or rewards).
The rights-assignment procedure assigns property rights by means of adjudicating claims
under resource constraints.8 Voluntary exchange yields individually rational end-state alloca-
tions, leaving no one worse o↵ than at her endowment (determined by her property rights).
The rights-assignment is not based on preferences, which makes the procedure informationally
simple. The voluntary exchange procedure relies on individual preferences and endowments but
is not restricted by claims or by any constraint (other than individual rationality). Hence it can
take the form of any system of decision making providing each agent with the freedom of exer-
cising the property rights over her endowment. Therefore, focusing on market-based allocation
rules, we achieve the advantage of simple information processing and freedom of choice. Our
market-based allocation rules actually guarantee agents the welfare lower bounds determined
by their individual property rights. Furthermore, we show that the idea of guaranteeing agents
certain welfare lower bounds requires the use of market-based allocation rules.
Empirical support for market-based allocation rules has been reported in numerous practical
contexts. For instance, Field (2008) investigates the e↵ect of the urban land property rights
assignment on the labor supply in Peru. Doremus (2013) investigates the e↵ects of market-
based strategies in the context of fisheries. Aghakouchak et al. (2014) deal with the economic
role of water rights management and water markets during the Australian drought from 1997
until 2009.
Our main results show that market-based allocation rules so constructed, lead to fair (and
e cient) end-state allocations only when the rights-assignment procedure is carried out by one
of the three focal rationing rules, known as constrained equal awards, constrained equal losses,
and proportional.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We set up the model in Section 2. We provide
our main results in Section 3. We analyze an important application of our model in Section 4
and conclude in Section 5. We defer the proofs to the appendix.
8We impose solidarity in this procedure, modeled by the combination of two axioms, known as resource
monotonicity and consistency, as suggested by Moreno-Ternero and Roemer (2006, 2012), among others.
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2 The model and definitions
Let N ⌘ {1, 2, . . .} be the domain of potential agents and N ⌘ {N ⇢ N : 2  |N | < 1}
the family of finite non-empty subsets of N with at least two agents.9 There are ` privately
appropriable and infinitely divisible goods. Each agent i 2 N has a preference relationRi defined
on R`+, which satisfies the classical conditions of rationality (completeness and transitivity),
continuity (lower and upper contour sets are closed), strong monotonicity, and convexity (upper
contour sets are convex).10 Let R denote the domain of such admissible preferences.11
Consider population N 2 N with n agents. A collective resource, or social endowment,
⌦ 2 R`++ is an `-vector indicating the available amount of each good. Each agent i 2 N has
a claim (vector) ci 2 R`+ on the endowment. We consider problems in which the aggregate
claim of the agents exceeds (or equals) the social endowment of each good. Formally, the set
of agents N 2 N , the social endowment ⌦ 2 R`++, the profile of claims c ⌘ (ci)i2N 2 Rn`++,
such that ⌦ 5 Pi2N ci, and the profile of preference relations R ⌘ (Ri)i2N 2 RN constitute
an economy e ⌘ (N,⌦, c, R).12 If ⌦ = Pi2N ci, then e is a standard exchange economy and c
would be interpreted as a profile of individual endowments. If ` = 1 and ⌦ <
P
i2N ci, then e
is a standard bankruptcy problem (e.g., O’Neill, 1982).
Let E(N,⌦) denote the domain of economies with population N and social endowment ⌦,
and E the domain of all economies. Let E¯ ⇢ E be the domain of exchange economies. We often
denote the claims profile for an exchange economy (the endowment profile then) by ! ⌘ (!i)i2N
instead of c ⌘ (ci)i2N , and omit ⌦ from the description of the economy.13
As a motivating example for this model, suppose there are n agents sharing a river for water
supply. There are two goods: water w and some other “representative” good x. The amount
of water agent i utilizes, when there is no water shortage, is denoted by w¯i. This is i’s claim on
water. Suppose that, due to a drought, the aggregate water to be shared among the countries
is reduced to E  Pi2N w¯i. Let !xi be agent i’s endowment of the representative good x and
ci ⌘ (!xi , w¯i) her claim. Let ⌦ = (
P
i2N !
x
i , E) be the social endowment.
14 Finally, agents have
9Denote by |N | the cardinality of set N .
10As usual, we denote by Pi the strict preference associated with Ri, and by Ii the corresponding indi↵erence
relation.
11As preferences are continuous, we can represent them by continuous real-valued functions, and it is some-
times convenient to do so. For each i 2 N , let Ui : R`+ ! R be such a representation of agent i’s preferences,
and let U ⌘ (Ui)i2N . These representations will not have cardinal significance.
12Our mathematical notation x 5 y to relate vectors x, y 2 R`++ means that xi  yi for each i = 1, . . . `.
Thus, we are implicitly saying that no commodity exceeds the corresponding aggregate claim.
13For each N 2 N , M ⇢ N , and z 2 Rn`+ , we denote zM ⌘ (zi)i2M . Furthermore, for ease of notation, if
M = N \ {i}, for some i 2 N , we let z i ⌘ zM .
14Note that there is no conflict with regard to the ownership of the x-good.
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Figure 1. Market-based allocation rules. A market-based allocation rule S is the result of applying a
rights-assignment rule ' (possibly, satisfying resource monotonicity and a consistency axiom), and an exchange
rule F satisfying individual rationality, such that, for each e ⌘ (N,⌦, c, R) 2 E , S(e) = F (N,'(N,⌦, c), R). We
endorse that they satisfy a no-envy axiom.
preferences over the two goods and the profile of their preferences is denoted by R. Thus, an
economic environment in this case is also formalized by e ⌘ (N,⌦, c, R) 2 E , as in the model
just introduced.
A (feasible) allocation for e 2 E(N,⌦) is a profile of individual consumption bundles z ⌘
(zi)i2N 2 Rn`+ such that
P
i2N zi = ⌦. Let Z(N,⌦) ⌘ {z 2 Rn`+ :
P
i2N zi = ⌦} be the set of all
allocations for economies in E(N,⌦). Let Z ⌘ SN2N S⌦2R`++ Z(N,⌦). Given e ⌘ (N,⌦, c, R),
an allocation z 2 Z(N,⌦) is (Pareto) e cient if there is no other allocation z0 that makes
an agent better o↵ and everyone else at least as well o↵, that is, for some i 2 N , z0i Pi zi and
for each j 2 N\{i}, z0j Rj zj. An allocation rule S : E ! Z associates with each economy
e ⌘ (N,⌦, c, R) a non-empty set of allocations, i.e., a non-empty subset of Z(N,⌦).
We are mostly interested in allocation rules that are defined by the following two consecu-
tive procedures: First, a rights-assignment procedure mapping the non-preference information
(N,⌦, c) of each economy e ⌘ (N,⌦, c, R) into a profile of individual endowments ! ⌘ (!i)i2N
and, second, an exchange procedure determining final allocations for the resulting exchange
economy (N,!, R). This allows us to scrutinize the relationship between principles of fairness
imposed in each of these two procedures and principles of end-state fairness. Figure 1 presents
a diagram illustrating this approach.
2.1 Claims adjudication
A problem of adjudicating claims, briefly a claims problem, consists of a set of agents, a social
endowment, and a profile of conflicting claims. Formally, it is a triple (N,⌦, c) such that
⌦ 5Pi2N ci. Let C denote the domain of all claims problems. A rights-assignment rule ' : C !
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N2N Rn`+ associates with each claims problem (N,⌦, c) 2 C, “individual property rights” over
the social endowment, that is, an allocation ' (N,⌦, c) 2 Z(N,⌦), with 'i (N,⌦, c) 5 ci for each
i 2 N . This inequality condition is called claims-boundedness , and it requires that individual
property rights not exceed individual claims.15 We often refer to '(N,⌦, c) as the (individual)
endowment profile, set by rule ', for the claims problem (N,⌦, c). A rights-assignment rule '
then converts each economy e ⌘ (N,⌦, c, R) into an exchange economy e0 ⌘ (N,'(N,⌦, c), R).
We now define three central rights-assignment rules in the literature. The constrained equal
awards rule 'CEA splits the social endowment of each good as equally as possible, subject to
the condition that no agent is awarded more than her claim. The constrained equal losses rule
'CEL splits the social endowment of each good so as to make the losses of all agents as equal
as possible, subject to the condition that no agent gets a negative amount (of any good). The
proportional rule 'PRO equalizes, for each good, the ratios between awards and claims among
agents. Formally, for each problem (N,⌦, c) 2 C, each i 2 N , and each l 2 {1, . . . , `},
'CEAil (N,⌦, c) = min{cil, µl},
where µl > 0 is chosen so that 'CEA(N,⌦, c) 2 Z(N,⌦);
'CELil (N,⌦, c) = max{0, cil    l},
where  l > 0 is chosen so that 'CEL(N,⌦, c) 2 Z(N,⌦); and
'PROil (N,⌦, c) =
⌦lP
j2N cjl
cil.
We now present axioms for rights-assignment rules. First, when there is more to be divided,
nobody should lose. 16 Formally,
Resource Monotonicity. A rights-assignment rule ' satisfies resource monotonicity if,
for each (N,⌦, c) 2 C and each ⌦ 5 ⌦0,
'(N,⌦, c) 5 '(N,⌦0, c).
15This does not exclude the possibility of an end-state allocation of a good exceeding the claimed amount,
which may result after the subsequent exchange procedure. Note that there is also an implicit (lower) bound
condition in the range of the rights-assignment rule, which precludes agents from obtaining negative amounts.
16This axiom reflects a solidarity principle whose formalization in axiomatic work can be traced back to
Roemer (1986).
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An implication of resource monotonicity is that when the social endowment of a certain good
does not change, the allocation of that good should remain una↵ected by increases in the social
endowment of the other goods.
Another widely applied principle in the axiomatic literature, known as consistency, relates
the allocation made by a rule at a given problem to the allocation at the “reduced” problems,
faced by each subgroup of agents, in which the endowment is the sum of the amounts that have
been awarded to them. It requires that the application of the rule to each reduced problem
yield the allocation that the subgroup obtained in the original problem.17 Here we consider two
weaker principles pertaining to the exclusion of either agents with zero awards or agents with
full awards.18
The agents who receive nothing in a given dimension of the original problem have nothing
to contribute in the ensuing reduced problem. Thus, they may not be of interest to the other
agents in the process of reassessment of the original resolution. The next axiom requires that
excluding such agents should not alter how much the others get.
Zero-Award-Out-Consistency. A rights-assignment rule ' satisfies zero-award-out-consistency
if, for each (N,⌦, c) 2 C, each M ⇢ N , and each l 2 {1, . . . , `}, if, for each i 2 M ,
'il(N,⌦, c) = 0, then, for each j 2 N\M ,
'jl(N\M,
X
k2N\M
'k(N,⌦, c), cN\M) = 'jl(N,⌦, c).
Similarly, the agents whose claims were fully honored will not be interested in any further
reassessment. The next axiom requires that dismissing them should not a↵ect how much the
others get.
Full-Award-Out-Consistency. A rights-assignment rule ' satisfies full-award-out-consistency
if, for each (N,⌦, c) 2 C, each M ⇢ N , and each l 2 {1, . . . , `}, if, for each i 2 M ,
'il(N,⌦, c) = cil, then, for each j 2 N\M ,
'jl(N\M,
X
k2N\M
'k(N,⌦, c), cN\M) = 'jl(N,⌦, c).
17The reader is referred to Thomson (2012) for a thoughtful discussion of the normative underpinnings
underlying the notion of consistency (which are also connected to the principle of solidarity), as well as for a
list of references dealing with this notion.
18The two principles were mentioned in passing by Thomson (2014) for the specific case of (unidimensional)
bankruptcy problems. More recently, Harless (2016) has used them in the axiomatic characterization of a broad
family of rules for such a context. We consider them here for our more general (multidimensional) framework.
8
It should be noted that the three rights-assignment rules described above satisfy these two
axioms (as well as resource monotonicity).
2.2 Exchange
An exchange rule, F : E¯ ! Z, associates with each exchange economy e ⌘ (N,!, R) 2 E¯ a
non-empty set of feasible allocations, F (e) ✓ Z(N,⌦). Exchange rules are studied extensively
in the literature. The best known is the Walrasian (exchange) rule, FW , which associates with
each exchange economy the set of allocations in which each agent maximizes her preference
satisfaction over her budget set. Formally, for each e = (N,!, R) 2 E¯ , z⇤ ⌘ (z⇤i )i2N 2 FW (e), if
there exists a price vector p 2 R`+, such that, for each i 2 N , z⇤i 2 B(!i, p) = {zi 2 R`+ : p · zi 
p · !i} and for each zi 2 B(!i, p), z⇤i Ri zi. These allocations are called Walrasian allocations.
We shall also consider other rules that are not Walrasian, yet satisfy the following basic
condition for voluntary exchange:
Individual Rationality. An exchange rule F satisfies individual rationality if, for each
(N,!, R) 2 E¯ , each z 2 F (N,!, R), and each i 2 N ,
ziRi !i.
A trivial instance of an individually rational rule is the No-trade rule, which always selects
the endowment profile, i.e., FNT (N,!, R) = {!}, for each (N,!, R) 2 E¯ . Another example is
the Core rule, FC , selecting the allocations upon which no coalition of agents can improve.19 It
is well known that the Walrasian rule is a selection of the Core rule, i.e., for each (N,!, R) 2 E¯ ,
FW (N,!, R) ✓ FC(N,!, R).
The composition of a rights-assignment rule ' and an exchange rule F gives rise to an
allocation rule S(·) ⌘ F   ', that is, for each e ⌘ (N,⌦, c, R) 2 E ,
S(e) = F (N,'(N,⌦, c), R).
When the exchange rule satisfies individual rationality, we refer to the rules so constructed
as market-based allocation rules. The exchange rule relies on individual preferences and en-
dowments but is not restricted by claims or by any constraint other than individual rationality.
19A coalition of agents S ✓ N can improve upon an allocation z, when there is a feasible allocation (z0i)i2S
for coalition S, which makes at least one agent in S better o↵ than at z and all other agents in S at least as
well o↵ as at z.
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Hence it can take the form of any system of decision making where each agent makes an optimal
decision enjoying the freedom of exercising the property rights over her endowment.
2.3 End-state fairness
One of the fundamental notions in the theory of fair allocation is envy-freeness, which can be
traced back to Tinbergen (1953) and Foley (1967). The concept has come to play a central role
in the theory of fair allocation.20 An allocation satisfies no-envy, or is said to be envy-free, if no
agent prefers someone else’s consumption to her own. The next axiom requires that allocation
rules should yield only envy-free allocations. Formally,
No-Envy. An allocation rule S satisfies no-envy if, for each e ⌘ (N,⌦, c, R) 2 E and each
z 2 S (e), there is no pair i, j 2 N such that zj Pi zi.
The above notion disregards claims. The following ones will base envy comparisons on
them.
Given an allocation z 2 Z and an agent i 2 N , we call ci   zi the sacrifice agent i makes
at z. An allocation satisfies sacrifice-no-envy, or is said to be sacrifice-envy-free, if no agent
prefers someone else’s sacrifice to her own. The next axiom requires that allocation rules should
yield only sacrifice-envy-free allocations. Formally,
Sacrifice-No-Envy. An allocation rule S satisfies sacrifice-no-envy if, for each e ⌘
(N,⌦, c, R) 2 E and each z 2 S (e), there is no pair i, j 2 N , such that ci   (cj   zj) 2 R`+ and
[ci   (cj   zj)] Pi zi.
This notion extends fair net trades, introduced by Schmeidler and Vind (1972) for exchange
economies, to our problems with disputed properties.
Instead of measuring sacrifices with di↵erences (i.e., in absolute terms), we could measure
them with ratios (i.e., in relative terms). Given an allocation z 2 Z and an agent i 2 N , let
ci/zi ⌘ (ci1/zi1, . . . , cil/zil) be the relative sacrifice agent i makes at z, whenever it is well-
defined.21 A dual concept is relative compensation zi/ci ⌘ (zi1/ci1, . . . , zi`/ci`). Interpersonal
comparisons of relative sacrifices, or relative compensations, provide the same notion of no-envy.
Here we consider relative compensations.22 An allocation satisfies relative-no-envy, or is said
20See, for instance, Kolm (1972), Pazner and Schmeidler (1974), Feldman and Kirman (1974), and recent
surveys, such as Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011) and Thomson (2011).
21That includes the case in which cil > 0 and cil/zil = cil/0 ⌘ 1.
22If zil = 0 = cil, relative compensation is not well-defined. In this case, we adopt the convention that i is
considered to be getting zero relative compensation with regard to good l. If we do not follow this convention,
the results we provide in Section 3.3 would require an additional mild consistency axiom to hold.
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to be relative-envy-free, if no agent prefers someone else’s relative compensation to her own.
The next axiom requires that allocation rules should yield only relative-envy-free allocations.
Formally,
Relative-No-Envy. An allocation rule S satisfies relative-no-envy if, for each e ⌘ (N,⌦, c, R) 2
E , and each z 2 S (e), there is no pair i, j 2 N , such that ci ⇥ (zj/cj)Pi zi, where the product
⇥ is to be defined as the coordinate-wise multiplication.23
3 The results
We start this section with a result stating that the family of market-based allocation rules
is characterized by an axiom formalizing lower bounds on individual welfare levels, together
with an invariance axiom. Lower bound axioms have a long tradition in normative economics
and, in particular, are frequently invoked in the literature on fair allocation (e.g., Thomson,
2011). They model the idea that (end-state) outcomes should guarantee agents at least a
predetermined welfare level. Precisely, we propose that, for each claims problem, there exists
a feasible allocation !, bounded above by the claims profile, such that the allocation rule
guarantees all agents the welfare level they would achieve at !. Formally,
Lower Bound Property. An allocation rule S satisfies the lower bound property if for each
claims problem (N,⌦, c) 2 C, there exists a welfare lower bound, i.e., an allocation ! 2 Z(N,⌦)
with ! 5 c such that for each R 2 RN , each z 2 S (N,⌦, c, R), and each i 2 N ,
ziRi !i.
The welfare lower bound for a claims problem, if it exists, is unique, which is shown at the
proof of Proposition 1.
Given this property, claims can put a restriction on the choice of allocations through a↵ecting
the welfare lower bound. They may further restrict the choice only to compromise freedom of
choice. Hence we require them not to impose any further restriction, as stated in the next
axiom. It requires that the same allocations should be chosen for any pair of economies with
the same preferences and welfare lower bound, despite their di↵erences in claims.
Invariance. An allocation rule S satisfies invariance if, for each pair of claims problems
23For each pair x = (x1, . . . , x`), y = (y1, . . . , y`) 2 R`+, let x⇥ y ⌘ (x1y1, . . . , x`y`).
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(N,⌦, c) and (N,⌦, c0) 2 C sharing a common welfare lower bound,
S (N,⌦, c, R) = S (N,⌦, c0, R) .
for each R 2 RN .
The lower bound property and invariance together characterize the family of market-based
allocation rules, as stated in the following result.
Proposition 1 An allocation rule satisfies the lower bound property and invariance if and
only if it is a market-based allocation rule.24
The proofs of all the results of this section, including Proposition 1, are relegated to the
appendix. We devote the rest of the section to axiomatic characterizations of market-based
allocation rules involving the three focal rights-assignment rules (constrained equal awards,
constrained equal losses, and proportional). The main axioms are the three notions of end-
state fairness introduced above.
3.1 No-envy and the constrained equal awards rule
A trivial way of guaranteeing no-envy is to divide equally. However, equal division disre-
gards both preferences and claims. Thus, it is typically ine cient and often violates claims-
boundedness. Consequently, it does not always qualify as an end-state allocation obtained by a
market-based allocation rule.
It is well-known that, in exchange economies with individual endowments, no-envy and
individual rationality may be incompatible. If endowments are extremely unequal, any indi-
vidually rational exchange makes an agent with a small endowment envy another agent with
a large endowment. The same incompatibility prevails in our economies, when the distribu-
tion of claims is very unequal. Therefore, we require no-envy only for those economies in
which claims are not too unevenly distributed. Formally, consider the domain of economies,
denoted by E0, where the equal division satisfies claims-boundedness, i.e., E0 ⌘ {(N,⌦, c, R) 2
E : for all i 2 N , ⌦/n 5 ci}. Let C0 be the corresponding domain of claims problems, i.e.,
C0 ⌘ {(N,⌦, c) 2 C : for all i 2 N , ⌦/n 5 ci}.
24We thank a referee who pointed out a mistake in the earlier version of the proposition without invariance,
which is essential for the equivalence. Counterexamples are available upon request.
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The first result of this section is that, to guarantee no-envy, we should focus on the domain
of economies E0. A domain is said to be a maximal domain on which a market-based allocation
rule satisfies no-envy, if there is a market-based allocation rule satisfying no-envy on the domain,
and there is no such rule on any larger domain.
Proposition 2 The domain E0 is the unique maximal domain on which a market-based alloca-
tion rule satisfies no-envy. Moreover, there is an e cient market-based allocation rule satisfying
no-envy on this domain.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is the following. Suppose that the rights-assignment rule
chooses unequal endowments for a pair of agents, i and j. This is necessarily the case in any
economy outside the maximal domain, due to claims-boundedness. As the rights-assignment
rule ignores preferences, this unequal rights-assignment applies for all admissible preference
profiles within our domain. Then, there exists a profile of preferences for which j prefers
i’s endowment to her own. Now, the end-state allocation, obtained from these endowments
through any individually rational trade, can be so close to the endowments that j still prefers
i’s bundle after trading. Therefore, the unequal rights-assignment for such an economy makes
envy inevitable. This explains the first statement of the proposition, as well as why the rights-
assignment rule necessarily chooses equal division (which coincides with the constrained equal
awards outcome on the maximal domain) whenever possible, as stated in Theorem 1.
As for the second statement, one can just resort to the composition of the constrained equal
awards rule and the Walrasian exchange rule. On the maximal domain, such a market-based
allocation rule yields envy-free and e cient end-state allocations. No-envy holds because
individual budget sets are identical across agents and each agent selects her most preferred
bundle in her budget set. E ciency follows from the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare
Economics.
The composition of the constrained equal awards rule and the Walrasian exchange rule is
akin to the Walrasian rule from equal division, which has emerged as a focal allocation rule
in the literature on fair allocation and distributive justice (e.g., Dworkin, 1981; Yaari and
Bar-Hillel, 1984; Roemer, 1996; Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2011). When the equal division is
dominated by the claims bound of all agents, they coincide. For classical exchange economies,
the Walrasian rule from equal division has been axiomatized in several ways. In particular,
Thomson (1988) shows that the Walrasian rule from equal division or its “subcorrespondences”
are the only exchange rules that are envy-free, e cient and independent of “non-essential”
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entries of new members.
Now, there are infinitely many envy-free and e cient allocations at typical economies within
the maximal domain E0. Thus, there are infinitely many allocation rules satisfying e ciency
and no-envy on such a domain. Nevertheless, when one focuses on market-based allocation
rules, generated from rights-assignment rules satisfying resource monotonicity and full-award-
out-consistency, only those adopting equal division for the rights-assignment remain, as stated
in the next result.
Theorem 1 Given a rights-assignment rule ' satisfying resource monotonicity and full-award-
out-consistency, the following statements are equivalent:
1. For some individually rational exchange rule F , the market-based allocation rule S ⌘ F  '
satisfies no-envy on E0.
2. ' is the constrained equal awards rule.
Hence, the constrained equal award rule is the only rights-assignment rule, among those
satisfying resource monotonicity and full-award-out-consistency, which generates, together with
an individually rational exchange rule, a market-based allocation rule satisfying no-envy on E0.
We emphasize that the proof of Theorem 1 relies on two additional axioms for rights-assignment
rules; namely, resource monotonicity and full-award-out-consistency. Nevertheless, dropping
them does not change the result on the maximal domain E0 (see Corollary 1 in the appendix).
3.2 Sacrifice-no-envy and the constrained equal losses rule
A trivial way of guaranteeing sacrifice-no-envy is to allocate equally the total loss (sacrifice)
society has to bear. Nevertheless, the equal sacrifice allocation is typically ine cient, as it
disregards preferences. Moreover, it may yield negative consumptions for some agents, in
which case it is not feasible.
Claims are the maximum sacrifices agents can a↵ord and so agents with relatively small
claims tend to experience small sacrifices whereas agents with relatively large claims tend to
experience large sacrifices. For such economies, any market-based allocation rule may yield
allocations violating sacrifice-no-envy. Therefore, we require sacrifice-no-envy only for those
economies where claims are not too unequally distributed. Formally, for each (N,⌦, c) 2 C,
the equal sacrifice allocation divides the total sacrifice (
P
j2N cj   ⌦) equally among agents,
assigning to each agent i the bundle ci  (
P
j2N cj  ⌦)/n. Consider the domain of economies,
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denoted by E⇤, where the equal sacrifice allocation is feasible, i.e., E⇤ ⌘ {e = (N,⌦, c, R) 2 E :
for each i 2 N , 0 5 ci   (
P
j2N cj   ⌦)/n}. Let C⇤ be the corresponding domain of claims
problems.
The first result of this section is that, if we are interested in guaranteeing sacrifice-no-envy,
we should focus on E⇤. Such a domain is maximal in that respect. In other words, a market-
based allocation rule will generate allocations with envy in sacrifices, for any economy outside
the domain E⇤. No other domain has that property.
Proposition 3 The domain E⇤ is the unique maximal domain on which a market-based allo-
cation rule satisfies sacrifice-no-envy. Moreover, there is an e cient market-based allocation
rule satisfying sacrifice-no-envy on this domain.
The intuition behind the first statement of Proposition 3 can be provided as done earlier
for Proposition 2. As for the second statement, note that, on the maximal domain, the com-
position of the equal sacrifice allocation and the Walrasian exchange yields sacrifice-envy-free
and e cient end-state allocations. Sacrifice-no-envy holds in the resulting end-state alloca-
tions because the equal sacrifice allocation equalizes the initial sacrifices at the endowments,
and the Walrasian exchange provides equal trading opportunities across agents. Therefore, as
all agents face equal opportunities for end-state sacrifices (sums of the initial equal sacrifice
at endowments and a Walrasian trade), and choose optimally, no one would prefer someone
else’s sacrifice to her own. E ciency follows from the First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare
Economics.
The composition of the constrained equal losses rule and the Walrasian exchange rule does
not have a counterpart in the literature on fair allocation, as claims, which are collectively not
feasible, are the standard for making fairness comparisons and for determining the endowment
profile from which Walrasian exchange takes place. Nevertheless, this rule and the end-state
fairness concept (sacrifice-no-envy) used for the characterization, resemble the Walrasian rule
and the axiom of fair net trade, or trade-no-envy, introduced by Schmeidler and Vind (1972) in
exchange economies. The Walrasian rule is shown to be the unique rule satisfying “coalitional”
trade-no-envy if the number of agents is su ciently large (Gabszewicz, 1975).
Without resource monotonicity, the maximal domain result in Proposition 3 does not hold.
There are economies where sacrifice-no-envy can be satisfied by making agent’s sacrifices in-
comparable. For example, consider an allocation z where for each pair i, j 2 N , there is a
good l such that cil = 0 and cjl   zjl > 0. Then z is sacrifice-envy-free simply because agent
15
i’s bundle obtained after making j’s sacrifice has a negative component (good l) and so it
is incomparable to zi. There are economies where the incomparability of sacrifices occurs at
any feasible allocation,25 and adding these economies to E⇤, we may find a larger domain for
a sacrifice-envy-free market-based allocation rule. Resource monotonicity prevents allocation
rules from abusing the “trick” of making sacrifices incomparable, which allows us to get the
maximal domain result stated in the proposition.
Now, infinitely many allocation rules satisfy e ciency and sacrifice-no-envy within the
maximal domain E⇤. Nevertheless, when one focuses on market-based allocation rules generated
from rights-assignment rules satisfying resource monotonicity and zero-award-out-consistency,
only those adopting equal sacrifice for the rights-assignment remain, as stated in the next result.
Theorem 2 Given a rights-assignment rule ' satisfying resource monotonicity and zero-award-
out-consistency, the following statements are equivalent:
1. For some individually rational exchange rule F , the market-based allocation rule S ⌘ F  '
satisfies sacrifice no-envy on E⇤.
2. ' is the constrained equal losses rule.
Hence the constrained equal losses rule is the only rights-assignment rule, among those sat-
isfying resource monotonicity and zero-award-out-consistency, which generates, together with
an individually rational exchange rule, a market-based allocation rule satisfying sacrifice-no-
envy on E⇤. We emphasize that the proof of Theorem 2 relies on two additional axioms for
rights-assignment rules; namely, resource monotonicity and zero-award-out-consistency. Nev-
ertheless, dropping them does not change the result for two-agent economies without excessive
claims (that is, when everyone’s claim on each good is below the social endowment), as we
explain later in Remark 1.
3.3 Relative-no-envy and the proportional rule
We explore in this section the implications of relative-no-envy. In contrast with the previous two
sections, one can find a rights-assignment rule that, when composed with an individually rational
exchange rule, generates an allocation rule satisfying relative-no-envy on the “universal” domain
E . A simple example is the composition of the proportional rights-assignment and the no-trade
25Examples are all two-agents economies where the equal sacrifice allocation gives each agent a negative
amount of a good.
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exchange rule. Thus, the maximal domain on which a market-based allocation rule satisfies
relative-no-envy is the universal domain. This is in contrast with the counterpart results for
no-envy (Proposition 2) and sacrifice-no-envy (Proposition 3). Nevertheless, as stated in the
next proposition, relative-no-envy and e ciency are incompatible, which is also in contrast
with the mentioned results.26
Proposition 4 There is a market-based allocation rule satisfying relative-no-envy on the uni-
versal domain. However, relative-no-envy and e ciency are incompatible.
In contrast with the results of the previous sections involving other notions of no-envy, the
Walrasian rule cannot be used to prove the compatibility of relative-no-envy and e ciency,
as Walrasian allocations from the proportional rights-assignment may violate relative-no-envy,
as we show. In the case of no-envy, the (Walrasian) budget sets given by the equal division
provide equal opportunities for consumptions, which guarantees no-envy at the end-state Wal-
rasian allocations. Likewise, the budget sets provide equal opportunities for trades. Thus, when
the endowment profile is chosen at the equal sacrifice allocation, the budget sets provide equal
opportunities for “absolute sacrifices”, which guarantees sacrifice-no-envy at the end-state Wal-
rasian allocations. However, the budget sets given by the proportional rights-assignment do not
provide equal opportunities for “relative sacrifices”. This is why Walrasian exchange, though
composed with the proportional rights-assignment, does not guarantee relative-no-envy.
Now, we are ready to state the third characterization result.
Theorem 3 Given a rights-assignment rule ', the following statements are equivalent:
1. For some individually rational exchange rule F , the market-based allocation rule S ⌘ F  '
satisfies relative-no-envy.
2. ' is the proportional rule.
Hence the proportional rule is the only rights-assignment rule that generates, together with
an individually rational exchange rule, a market-based allocation rule satisfying relative-no-
envy.
Partly motivated by the somewhat di↵erent nature of the results for relative-no-envy, we
conclude by considering an alternate method of measuring “rates” of sacrifices, or rewards, and
26As it can be checked in its proof, the incompatibility remains valid in the standard model of exchange
economies.
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the corresponding axiom of no-envy. As we shall see, and in contrast with relative-no-envy,
this new notion is compatible with e ciency.
Formally, let z be a feasible allocation for an economy e ⌘ (N,⌦, c, R). For each i 2 N ,
denote by pi a supporting normal vector of i’s indi↵erence set at zi, that is, for each x with
xRi zi, pi · x   pi · zi. Then, pi gives agent i’s marginal rate of substitution between any two
goods. It is a price vector representing i’s subjective valuation of goods at the margin, up to
normalization. Note that zipi·ci is the vector consisting of the amounts of each good agent i gets
for each unit value of her claim, namely, per value consumption. Likewise, from i’s point of
view, zjpi·cj is the vector consisting of the amounts of each good agent j gets for each unit value
(measured by i’s price vector) of j’s claim. The comparative axiom of fairness with regard to
these vectors (per value consumptions) can be defined as follows.
We say that z satisfies ratio-no-envy at e ⌘ (N,⌦, c, R) if there is no pair i, j 2 N such
that for each supporting normal vector pi of i’s indi↵erence curve at zi,
pi · ci ⇥ zj
pi · cj Pi zi.
It turns out that there exist allocations satisfying ratio-no-envy and e ciency. They can be
obtained using the concept of proportional Walrasian allocation (e.g., Thomson, 1992) defined
next for our setting. An allocation z is a proportional Walrasian allocation for e ⌘ (N,⌦, c, R) 2
E if there is a price vector p such that z is obtained as a Walrasian allocation with individual
income profile (wi)i2N determined by dividing the value of the social endowment p · ⌦ in
proportion to the values of claims, (p · ci)i2N , i.e., for each i 2 N ,
wi ⌘ p · ci
p ·Pj2N cj p · ⌦.
Note that equilibrium price vector p is a “common” supporting normal vector of the indi↵erence
set of each agent at z. Using p, it can be shown that the proportional division allows all agents
to have equal opportunities of per value consumption, which makes the proportional Walrasian
allocations ratio-envy-free.
Proposition 5 There is an allocation rule satisfying ratio-no-envy and e ciency on the uni-
versal domain.
Proposition 4 showed that relative-no-envy (the counterpart of the notions of no-envy and
sacrifice-no-envy) is incompatible with e ciency. Proposition 5 shows that the alternative of
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ratio-no-envy can be reconciled with e ciency. Nevertheless, this result for ratio-no-envy calls
for a di↵erent approach to our problems, as the proportional Walrasian rule assigns individual
incomes using an equilibrium price vector that depends on preferences. This is discarded by our
two-step approach where any information on preferences is not needed for rights-assignment.
A similar route could be taken to define alternatives to no-envy and sacrifice-no-envy, in which
prices would also be involved in the determination of initial incomes. This seems unnecessary
given that the two original concepts can indeed be combined with e ciency, as shown by
Propositions 2 and 3.
4 An application: Greenhouse gas emission
As mentioned in the introduction, an interpretation of our model is one of cap-and-trade systems
for greenhouse gas (GHG) emission. We develop such an interpretation in this section.
Consider a simple model of energy production. There are two goods: the energy good e and
money m. The energy good is produced by using money as the input good. The production
technology exhibits constant returns to scale with marginal cost    0. Each agent i 2 N is
endowed with m¯i units of money and i’s preferences are represented by a quasi-linear utility
function ui(mi, ei) = mi+vi(ei), where vi(·) satisfies v0i(·) > 0, v00i (·) < 0, and limei!1 v0i(ei) = 0.
Given energy price p > 0, agent i attains her maximal preference satisfaction at (m¯i   pe?i , e?i ),
where e?i is the unique solution to p = v
0
i(ei). Let di(p) ⌘ (v0i) 1(p) be i’s energy demand
function and D(p) ⌘ Pi2N di(p) the market demand function. Under these conditions, it is
not di cult to show that there is a unique competitive equilibrium with energy price p = 
and allocation (mCEi , e
CE
i )i2N such that, for each i 2 N , eCEi ⌘ di() and mCEi = m¯i   eCEi .
Cap-and-trade The total energy consumption should be reduced to E  Pi2N eCEi , via a
cap-and-trade scheme. Such a scheme requires permits, which can be traded in a competitive
market, to consume units of energy. A cap-and-trade equilibrium consists of a permit assignment
(!ei )i2N , an energy price p
⇤ = , a permit price r⇤ and an allocation (m⇤i , e
⇤
i )i2N such thatP
i2N !
e
i = E =
P
i2N e
⇤
i , and, for each i 2 N , (m⇤i , e⇤i ) maximizes agent i’s utility, within the
budget set given by her money endowment and the value of her permit at those prices.
Augmenting the concept with redistributive transfers, an extended cap-and-trade equilibrium
consists of a permit assignment (!ei )i2N , an income transfer (⌧i)i2N , an energy price p
⇤ = , a
permit price r⇤, and an allocation (m⇤i , e
⇤
i )i2N such that
P
i2N !
e
i = E =
P
i2N e
⇤
i ,
P
i2N ⌧i = 0
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and, for each i 2 N , (m⇤i , e⇤i ) maximizes agent i’s utility, within the budget set given by her
money endowment, her income transfer and the value of her permit at those prices.
The extended cap-and-trade schemes are thus composed of the assignment of permits and
transfers, and individually rational market exchange of the two goods and permits. They
resemble our market-based allocation rules, and the first procedure of assigning emission rights
and transfers plays a critical role in making the final outcome fair. We will apply our results
here to obtain unique fair assignments in this setting.
The current model of energy production di↵ers from our model dealing with exchange
economies (without production and without permits). Hence, for the application of our results,
we need to establish a correspondence between the two models. We next show that, after
an appropriate transformation, the current model of energy production can be treated as an
example of our model, and the cap-and-trade equilibrium as a Walrasian equilibrium.
Claims adjudication and exchange For each i 2 N , let e¯i denote the benchmark energy
consumption for agent i.27 Then, i’s claim is given by ci ⌘ (m¯i, e¯i).28 Let ⌦ ⌘ (
P
i2N m¯i  
E,E) be the social endowment, and R a profile of quasilinear preferences, as described above.
Thus, an economic environment in this case is also formalized by e ⌘ (N,⌦, c, R), as in Section 2.
We then have the following correspondence between extended cap-and-trade equilibria and
Walrasian equilibria, whose proof is provided also in the appendix.
Proposition 6 The allocation obtained as an extended cap-and-trade equilibrium with permit
assignment (!ei )i2N and transfer (⌧i)i2N coincides with the allocation obtained as a Walrasian
equilibrium from the (rights-assignment) endowment profile (m¯i + ⌧i   !ei ,!ei )i2N .
For ease of exposition, we focus on economies where each agent claims su ciently large
amounts of both goods and, thus, concentrate on the domain E0 \ E⇤.
It then follows from Theorem 1 and Proposition 6 that, under the presence of resource
monotonicity and full-award-out-consistency for the rights-assignment, the extended cap-and-
trade scheme satisfies no-envy only if all agents are assigned equal amounts of permits and
27This reflects current energy needs and satisfies
P
i2N e¯i =
P
i2N e
CE
i . In particular, one may consider the
equilibrium allocation as the benchmark energy needs, i.e., e¯i = eCEi , for each i 2 N .
28Note that, in the context of reducing GHG emissions, the Kyoto Protocol imposes no emission reduction
on developing nations, which, in our model, means assigning a greater amount of emission permits than the
claimed amount (emission in a base year) by each developing nation. This is the key criticism to the Kyoto
Protocol by Posner and Weisbach (2010, p.3). Our model imposes claims boundedness at the initial stage of
rights assignment. But, as mentioned above, it does not preclude the possibility of agents obtaining amounts
above their claims after the second stage of exchange from initial rights takes place.
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transfers equalizing their (post-transfer) money endowments.29
Similarly, it follows from Theorem 2 and Proposition 6 that, under the presence of resource
monotonicity and zero-award-out-consistency for the rights-assignment, the extended cap-and-
trade scheme satisfies sacrifice-no-envy only if all agents are assigned the permits and transfers
equalizing their (energy and money) sacrifices.30
Finally, the proportional rights-assignment is obtained as the initial endowment of the
cap-and-trade scheme when each agent receives the proportional permit assignment and the
proportional transfer.31 Unlike the two rights-assignments considered earlier, Theorem 3 and
the proportional rights-assignment cannot be applied to advocate the corresponding cap-and-
trade scheme.
5 Concluding remarks
We have presented a general model of exchange economies to study the allocation of disputed
properties, while accommodating the three levels in which fairness can be scrutinized in this
context; namely, fairness in the initial assignment of rights on disputed properties, fairness
in the transaction of the assigned rights, and fairness of the end-state allocation. We have
focused, in such a context, on allocation rules that are represented by a composition of a rights-
assignment rule (to assign each profile of conflicting claims an endowment profile) and Walrasian
or other individually rational exchange rules. Our main results are characterizations of three
egalitarian rights-assignment rules. In particular, we have characterized two rights-assignment
rules (constrained equal awards rule and constrained equal losses rule) that, when composed
with Walrasian exchange, give rise to e ciency, as well as two related forms of no-envy. The
third rights-assignment rule (the proportional rule) gives rise to a third form of no-envy which
is, however, incompatible with e ciency.
Prior investigation on using no-envy as both procedural and end-state principles of fairness
has produced negative results (e.g., Kolm; 1972; Feldman and Kirman, 1974). For instance,
the combination of envy-free initial allocation (equal division) and a sequence of envy-free
trades may lead to a core allocation with envy. Our three main characterization results impose
three versions of no-envy as the principle of end-state fairness and obtain no-envy (with some
29That is, for each i 2 N , !ei = E/n and ⌧i =
P
j2N m¯j/n  m¯i.
30That is, for each i 2 N , !ei = e¯i   {
P
j2N e¯j   E}/n and ⌧i = 
⇣
e¯i   {
P
j2N e¯j}/n
⌘
.
31That is, for each i 2 N , !ei = Ee¯i/
P
j2N e¯j and ⌧i = E
⇣
e¯i/
P
j2N e¯j   m¯i/
P
j2N m¯j
⌘
.
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constraints) of the initial allocation as an implication. We do not insist on no-envy as a
requirement for rights-assignment. Instead, we impose other standard axioms (such as claims-
boundedness, resource monotonicity, and consistency for rights-assignment rules, and individual
rationality and e ciency for exchange rules) in the two procedures.32
One might argue that some of our requirements for the two procedures are not entirely
appealing in our setting. For instance, we acknowledge that resource monotonicity uses the ob-
jective standard of comparison of the e↵ects of resource changes on individuals, instead of using
the subjective standard of well-being. Now, this makes the first step of our process information-
ally simple. We believe that this is, actually, a merit instead of a shortcoming of our approach.
This parsimony may be problematic if it would lead to incompatibility with other important
preference-related requirements. But our results are mostly constructive. Furthermore, without
resource monotonicity, similar results for two-agent economies hold.
In standard exchange economies (with homothetic preferences), Moulin and Thomson (1988)
consider resource monotonicity as an end-state axiom. They show that it is not compatible
with e ciency and no-envy. Therefore, requiring the end-state resource monotonicity is too
strong in our framework. We impose it only in the rights-assignment procedure. That is, when
the resource increases, every agent, whatever her preferences are, should be at least as well-o↵
as earlier at the rights-assignment stage. Nevertheless, agents may be worse o↵ in the end-state;
so the market-based allocation rule violates end-state resource monotonicity. But this worsened
end-state is due to their own voluntary decision in the exchange procedure, and so it is not a
moral concern in our approach. This way, resource monotonicity becomes less demanding and
allows us to generate constructive conclusions.
Alternatively, we could have considered a weakening of resource monotonicity stating that
when the social endowment of a certain good does not change, the allocation of that good
should remain una↵ected by increases in the social endowment of the other goods. This axiom
would be enough to prove our results. Due to the fact that the original resource monotonicity
axiom has a long tradition in axiomatic work (especially in the literature dealing with claims
problems or fair allocations), we have decided to use that axiom in the paper. Other related
axioms, with the same informational requirements and equally parsimonious, would not be
valid to obtain our results. An instance would be an axiom stating that, as the endowment
increases, nobody receives a smaller amount of every good (which allows for the opportunity
32Our model and the procedural approach follow the lesson on procedural fairness delineated by Thom-
son (2011, pp.419-422).
22
that, upon the increase of the endowment of one good, an agent receives a smaller award of
another good, provided she received more of the good which the endowment increased, which
seems natural in some situations).
In standard exchange economies, Thomson (1983) is also concerned with the three levels of
justice: fair initial position (endowment), fair trade, and fair end-state. In his approach, the
principle of fair trade plays a central role and the principle of fair initial position is formulated
through the exchange of the initial positions (as in the definition of no-envy) and their objections
based on the principle of fair trade from any reshu✏ed position. His main result says that if one
accepts Walrasian trade to be a fair trade rule and the possibility of exchanging initial positions,
then the only fair initial position is equal division. Our Theorem 1 reinforces this conclusion in
the extended framework and using a di↵erent procedural approach. Unlike Thomson (1983),
we use no-envy as the end-state fairness axiom and characterize egalitarian rights-assignment
rules for the first procedure.
Our model is also related to a model introduced by Thomson (1992, 2007).33 The aim
in that model is to formulate notions of consistency for exchange economies augmented by a
social deficit. Mathematically, the model of “deficit-sharing exchange economies” (on p.184,
Thomson, 2007) is identical to ours, if the deficit T in his model is defined to be the di↵erence
between the sum of the claims and the aggregate endowment in our model. However, we do
not impose consistency on our allocation rule, but only on our rights-assignment rules. Thus,
due to the claims-boundedness property of rights-assignment rules, defining consistency is not
an issue in our context.
The validity of our three end-state fairness axioms should be judged context by context. In
some applications, claims may be perceived as indicating “credits”, and in other applications,
as indicating “discredits”. In bankruptcy problems, claims are amounts invested; the greater
they are, the more credits are attributed to the claimants. On the other hand, in allocating
pollution permits, claims may represent current or past emissions and greater claims mean
greater discredits, or greater responsibility for environmental damage. When claims are credits,
they deserve special attention in judging fairness and so no-envy, which disregards claims, does
not qualify as a valid criterion. In such a scenario, our results pin down the proportional and
the constrained equal losses rules as the only fair rights-assignment rules. When claims are
discredits, using them in judging fairness, as in sacrifice-no-envy and relative-no-envy, does
not agree with our moral intuition. Then, our results point towards constrained equal awards
33See also Peleg (1996) and Korthues (2000).
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as the unique fair rights-assignment rule. This is our justification for proposing equal per
capita allocation of GHG emission rights. The axiom of no-envy does not directly involve the
allocation of rights; it emphasises the welfare consequences of this allocation upon individual
agents. Section 4 gives a formal presentation of this case as an example of our model.
6 Appendix
We provide in this appendix the proofs of all the results stated throughout the paper. We start
with the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. We first show that the welfare lower bound for a claims problem,
when it exists, is unique. Suppose, by contradiction, that there is an allocation rule S, and a
claims problem (N,⌦, c), for which there exist two welfare lower bounds ! and !0. Then, there
exist i 2 N and p 2 R`++ such that p · !i < p · !0i. Let R 2 RN be such that
(i) Ri is the linear preference relation represented by u(x) ⌘ p · x,
(ii) For each h 6= i, Rh is strictly convex and strongly monotonic, and
(iii) ! is Pareto e cient at R.
Now, suppose that there is z 2 S (N,⌦, c, R)\{!}. As ! is a welfare lower bound, it follows
that, for each j 2 N , zj Rj !j. As z 6= !, it follows by (iii) that zj Ij !j, for each j 2 N . Let
  2 (0, 1) and z  =  z + (1   )!. By (i), z i Ii!i. By (ii), z j Pj!j, for each j 2 N . Altogether,
we have a contradiction with (iii). Hence, S (N,⌦, c, R) ⌘ {!}. Now, by (i), !0iPi!i, which
contradicts the assumption that !0 was a welfare lower bound for (N,⌦, c).
Next, to prove the “only-if” part, let S be an allocation rule satisfying the lower bound prop-
erty and invariance. Let ' : C ! SN2N Rn`+ be such that, for each (N,⌦, c) 2 C, '(N,⌦, c) = !,
where ! is the welfare lower bound (for (N,⌦, c)) whose existence is guaranteed by the lower
bound property. As shown earlier, the welfare lower bound is unique and so, ' is a well-defined
rights-assignment rule. Let   denote the image of ' and E¯  the domain of exchange economies
generated by endowment profiles in  . Then, let F : E¯ ! Z be such that, for each (N,!, R) 2 E¯ ,
F (N,!, R) =
8<: S (N,⌦, c, R) , if (N,!, R) 2 E¯ {!}, otherwise ,
where c 2 Rn`++ is such that '(N,⌦, c) = !. By invariance, the value of F is independent of
choosing another claims profile c0 with '(N,⌦, c0) = !. Hence, F is well-defined. By the lower
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bound property, F is individually rational. Therefore, as S (N,⌦, c, R) = F (N,'(N,⌦, c), R),
for each (N,⌦, c, R) 2 E , it follows that S is a market-based allocation rule.
Conversely, let S be a market-based allocation rule. Then, there exist a rights-assignment
rule ' and an exchange rule F satisfying individual rationality, such that, for each e ⌘
(N,⌦, c, R) 2 E , S(e) = F (N,'(N,⌦, c), R). For each (N,⌦, c) 2 C, let ! ⌘ '(N,⌦, c).
Then, by claims-boundedness, !  c. Furthermore, by individual rationality, it follows that,
for each R 2 RN , each z 2 S(e), and each i 2 N , zi Ri !i. Hence, ! is the welfare lower
bound for (N,⌦, c), which shows that S satisfies the lower bound property. Furthermore, as
S is the composition of ' and F , it follows that, for each c0 2 Rn`++ with '(N,⌦, c0) = !,
S (N,⌦, c, R) = S (N,⌦, c0, R), for each R 2 RN . Thus, S satisfies invariance.
We now present a preliminary lemma that is used for proving Proposition 2 and Theorem 1.
Lemma 1 Let ' be a rights-assignment rule and let F be an individually rational exchange rule.
If the market-based allocation rule S ⌘ F   ' satisfies no-envy, then, for each (N,⌦, c) 2 C,
'(N,⌦, c) = (⌦/n, . . . ,⌦/n).
Proof. Let F and ' be as in the lemma. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists (N,⌦, c) 2
C such that ! ⌘ '(N,⌦, c) 6= ⌦/n. Then, as Pk2N !k = ⌦, there exist i, j 2 N and p 2 R`++
such that p · !i < p · ⌦n < p · !j. Let e = (N,⌦,!, R) 2 E be such that Ri is represented by
Ui : x! p · x, Rh is strictly convex for each h 2 N \ {i}, and ! is Pareto e cient at R. Then,
! is the only feasible allocation that satisfies individual rationality.34 Hence, ! = F (N,!, R).
As p · !j > p · !i, agent i prefers j’s bundle to his own, contradicting no-envy.
The first statement of Proposition 2 follows immediately from Lemma 1. As for its second
statement, it su ces to consider the constrained equal awards rule composed with the Walrasian
exchange rule.
Proof of Theorem 1. The composition of the constrained equal awards rule and the
Walrasian exchange rule proves that the second statement implies the first statement. In order
to prove the converse, let ' be a rights-assignment rule satisfying resource monotonicity and
full-award-out-consistency that, when composed with an individually rational exchange rule F ,
leads to a market-based allocation rule S ⌘ F   ' satisfying no-envy on E0.
34This is because if there is any other individually rational allocation z, a convex combination of z and ! will
be a Pareto improvement of !, contradicting Pareto e ciency of !.
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For each l 2 {1, . . . , `   1}, let C(l) ⌘ {(N,⌦, c) 2 C : 8k   l + 1, 8i 2 N, ⌦k/|N |  cik}.
Let C(`) ⌘ C and C(0) ⌘ C0. We show that for each k = 0, 1, . . . , `, ' coincides with 'CEA on
C(k), by induction on the number of commodities k. By Lemma 1, ' coincides with 'CEA on
C(0). Let l 2 {1, . . . , `}. Suppose, by induction, that ' coincides with 'CEA on C(k) for each
k  l   1. We prove that ' coincides with 'CEA on C(l).
Let N 2 N and c ⌘ (ci)i2N 2 Rn`++. Let C(N, c)(l) be the domain of claims problems in C(l)
with population N and claims profile c. In what follows, we prove that ' coincides with 'CEA
on C(N, c)(l). For ease of exposition, assume, without loss of generality, that N = {1, . . . , n}
and that claims on the l-th commodity are increasingly ordered, i.e., c1l  · · ·  cnl. For each
m 2 {1, 2, . . . , n  1}, let35
C(N, c)(l)m = {(N,⌦, c) 2 C(N, c)(l) :
X
im 1
cil+(n m+1)cml  ⌦l 
X
im
cil+(n m)cm+1,l}.
Furthermore, let
C(N, c)(l)0 = {(N,⌦, c) 2 C(N, c)(l) : ⌦l  nc1l}.
Then, it is straightforward to see that C(N, c)(l) = Sn 1m=0 C(N, c)(l)m. For eachm = 0, 1, . . . , n 
1 and each (N,⌦, c) 2 C(N, c)(l)m,
'CEAl (N,⌦, c) = (c1l, . . . , cml, m, . . . , m), (1)
where  m = [⌦l  
Pm
i=1 cil]/(n m).
We now show, by induction on the number of agents m, that for each m 2 {0, 1, . . . , n  1}
and each (N,⌦, c) 2 C(N, c)(l)m, '(N,⌦, c) = 'CEA(N,⌦, c). Note that, as C(N, c)(l)0 ⇢
C(l   1), ' coincides with 'CEA on C(N, c)(l)0. Let m 2 {1, 2, . . . , n   1}. Suppose that if
(N,⌦, c) 2 C(N, c)(l)m 1, '(N,⌦, c) = 'CEA(N,⌦, c). Let (N,⌦, c) 2 C(N, c)(l)m. We aim to
show that '(N,⌦, c) = 'CEA(N,⌦, c).
Let ⌦0l ⌘
P
im 1 cil+(n m+1)cml and ⌦0 ⌘ (⌦0l,⌦ l). Then, (N,⌦0, c) 2 C(N, c)(l)m 1\
C(N, c)(l)m. As (N,⌦0, c) 2 C(N, c)(l)m 1,
'(N,⌦0, c) = 'CEA(N,⌦0, c). (2)
As, for each l0 6= l, ⌦0l0 = ⌦l0 , then by resource monotonicity, 'l0(N,⌦, c) = 'l0(N,⌦0, c) and
35We use the notational convention that
P
i0 cil = 0.
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'CEAl0 (N,⌦, c) = '
CEA
l0 (N,⌦
0, c). Hence, using (2), we obtain: for each l0 6= l,
'l0(N,⌦, c) = '
CEA
l0 (N,⌦, c). (3)
We only have to show that (3) holds also for l0 = l. As (N,⌦0, c) 2 C(N, c)(l)m, then by (1)
and (2), for each i  m, 'il(N,⌦0, c) = cil. As ⌦0l ⌘
P
im 1 cil + (n   m + 1)cml  ⌦l (the
inequality holds because (N,⌦, c) 2 C(N, c)(l)m), then by resource monotonicity and claims
boundedness, for each i  m, 'il(N,⌦, c) = cil. Hence, by (1), for each i  m, 'il(N,⌦, c) =
'CEAil (N,⌦, c).
If m = n   1, then it follows from the above result and the resource constraint that
'nl(N,⌦, c) = 'CEAnl (N,⌦, c), completing the proof.
Ifm < n 1, letM ⌘ {1, . . . ,m} and ⌦¯ ⌘ ⌦ Pi2M 'i(N,⌦, c). Consider (N\M, ⌦¯, cN\M).
Note that, for each l0   l + 1 and each i = 1, . . . ,m, 'il0(N,⌦, c) = ⌦l0/n and, for each
i 2 N , ⌦l0/n  cil0 . Then, for each i 2 N , ⌦¯l0/(n   m) = ⌦l0/n  cil0 . Moreover, from
⌦¯l/(n  m) = (⌦l  
Pm
i=1 cil)/(n  m)  cm+1,l  · · ·  cnl (the first inequality holds because
(N,⌦, c) 2 C(N, c)(l)m), it follows that (N\M, ⌦¯, cN\M) 2 C(l  1). Thus, '(N\M, ⌦¯, cN\M) =
'CEA(N\M, ⌦¯, cN\M).
By full-award-out-consistency, for each i 2 N\M , 'il(N,⌦, c) = 'il(N\M, ⌦¯, cN\M) and
'CEAil (N,⌦, c) = '
CEA
il (N\M, ⌦¯, cN\M). Therefore, for each i = m + 1, . . . , n, 'il(N,⌦, c) =
'CEAil (N,⌦, c), completing the proof that (3) holds also for l
0 = l.
The proof of Lemma 1 and, thus, that of Proposition 2, rely on neither resource monotonicity
nor full-award-out-consistency. It is clear then that the same result as in Theorem 1 holds on
E0, without imposing the two solidarity axioms for rights-assignment rules. Formally,
Corollary 1 Given a rights-assignment rule ' defined on domain C0, the following statements
are equivalent:
1. For some individually rational exchange rule F , the market-based allocation rule S ⌘ F ',
defined on domain E0, satisfies no-envy.
2. ' is the constrained equal awards rule.
We now move to the results in Section 3.2. In order to prove Proposition 3 and Theorem 2,
we need a preliminary lemma.
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Lemma 2 Let ' be a rights-assignment rule satisfying resource monotonicity, and let F be an
exchange rule satisfying individual rationality. If the market-based allocation rule S ⌘ F   '
satisfies sacrifice-no-envy, then, for each (N,⌦, c) 2 C, '(N,⌦, c) = (ci  (
P
i2N ci ⌦)/n)i2N .
Proof. Let F and ' be as in the lemma. Let !es ⌘ (ci   (
P
i2N ci   ⌦)/n)i2N be the equal
sacrifice allocation. Suppose, by contradiction, that ! = '(N,⌦, c) 6= !es. Then, there are
i, j 2 N such that !i   ci 6= !j   cj. We distinguish two cases:
Case 1. ci   [cj   !j] 2 R`+.
Subcase 1.1. Neither ci   [cj   !j]   !i nor ci   [cj   !j]   !i.
Then there is p 2 R`++ such that
p · !i = p · (ci   [ci   !i]) < p · (ci   [cj   !j]).
Let R 2 RN be such that (i) Ri is the linear preference represented by u(x) ⌘ p · x, (ii) for
each h 6= i, Rh is strictly convex and strongly monotonic, and (iii) ! is Pareto e cient at R.
Then, by the strict convexity of some preferences, ! is the only individually rational allocation
at (N,!, R). Therefore, ! = F (N,!, R). Then, the above inequality says that agent i prefers
the sacrifice made by agent j, contradicting sacrifice-no-envy.
Subcase 1.2. ci   [cj   !j]   !i or ci   [cj   !j]   !i.
When the former (latter) inequality holds, using the same argument as in Subcase 1.1, we
can show that there is an exchange economy with endowment profile !, where ! is the only
individually rational allocation and so it is chosen by F . Then, agent i (agent j) prefers the
sacrifice of agent j (agent i), again contradicting sacrifice-no-envy.
Case 2. ci   [cj   !j] /2 R`+.
In this case, for some k = 1, . . . , `, cik   [cjk   !jk] < 0. Then, as cik   [cik   !ik] = !ik  
0 > cik   [cjk   !jk], it follows that !ik   cik > !jk   cjk. Let ⌦0 be such that, for each l 6= k,
⌦0l ⌘
P
i2N cil and ⌦
0
k ⌘ ⌦k. Let !0 ⌘ '(N,⌦0, c). Then, by claims-boundedness, for each
h 2 N and all l 6= k, !0hl = chl. As ⌦0k = ⌦k, it follows by resource monotonicity that, for each
h 2 N , !0hk = !hk. Then, !0ik   cik = !ik   cik > !jk   cjk = !0jk   cjk and, for each l 6= k,
!0il  cil = 0 = !0jl  cjl. Therefore !0i  ci   !0j   cj and so cj   [ci !0i] 2 R`+. Then, again, we
can adapt the argument of Case 1, switching the roles of i and j and replacing (N,⌦, c) and !
with (N,⌦0, c) and !0, respectively.
The first statement of Proposition 3 follows immediately from Lemma 2. As for its second
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statement, it su ces to consider the constrained equal losses rule composed with the Walrasian
exchange rule.
Proof of Theorem 2. The composition of the constrained equal losses rule and the Walrasian
exchange rule proves that the second statement implies the first statement. In order to prove
the converse, let ' be a rights-assignment rule satisfying resource monotonicity and zero-award-
out-consistency that, when composed with an individually rational exchange rule F , leads to a
market-based allocation rule S ⌘ F   ' satisfying sacrifice-no-envy on E⇤.
For each l 2 {1, . . . , `   1}, let C⇤(l) ⌘ {(N,⌦, c) 2 C : 8k   l + 1, 8i 2 N, (Pj2N cjk  
⌦k)/|N |  cik}. Let C⇤(`) ⌘ C and C⇤(0) ⌘ C⇤. We show, by induction on the number of goods
l, that for each l = 0, 1, . . . , `, ' coincides with 'CEL on C⇤(l). By Lemma 2, ' coincides with
'CEL on C⇤(0). Let l 2 {1, . . . , `}. Suppose, by induction, that ' coincides with 'CEL on C⇤(k)
for each k  l   1. We prove that ' coincides with 'CEL on C⇤(l).
LetN 2 N and c ⌘ (ci)i2N 2 Rn`++. Let C⇤(N, c)(l) be the domain of claims problems in C⇤(l)
with population N and claims profile c. In what follows, we prove that ' coincides with 'CEL
on C⇤(N, c)(l). For ease of exposition, assume, without loss of generality, that N = {1, . . . , n}
and that claims on the l-th commodity are increasingly ordered, i.e., c1l  · · ·  cnl. For each
m 2 {1, 2, . . . , n  1}, let
C⇤(N, c)(l)m = {(N,⌦, c) 2 C⇤(N, c)(l) :
nX
i=m+1
cil (n m)cm+1,l  ⌦l 
nX
i=m
cil (n m+1)cml}.
Furthermore, let
C⇤(N, c)(l)0 = {(N,⌦, c) 2 C⇤(N, c)(l) :
nX
i=1
cil   nc1l  ⌦l}.
Then, it is straightforward to see that C⇤(N, c)(l) = Sn 1m=0 C⇤(N, c)(l)m. For eachm = 0, 1, . . . , n 
1 and each (N,⌦, c) 2 C⇤(N, c)(l)m,
'CELl (N,⌦, c) = (0, . . . , 0, cm+1,l   µm, . . . , cnl   µm), (4)
where µm ⌘ (
Pn
i=m+1 cil   ⌦l)/(n m).
We now show, by induction on the number of agents m, that for each m 2 {0, 1, . . . , n  1}
and each (N,⌦, c) 2 C⇤(N, c)(l)m, '(N,⌦, c) = 'CEL(N,⌦, c). Note that, as C⇤(N, c)(l)0 ⇢
C⇤(l   1), ' coincides with 'CEL on C⇤(N, c)(l)0. Let m 2 {1, 2, . . . , n   1}. Suppose that if
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(N,⌦, c) 2 C⇤(N, c)(l)m 1, '(N,⌦, c) = 'CEL(N,⌦, c). Let (N,⌦, c) 2 C⇤(N, c)(l)m. We aim
to show that '(N,⌦, c) = 'CEL(N,⌦, c).
Let ⌦0l ⌘
Pn
i=m cil   (n m+ 1)cml and ⌦0 ⌘ (⌦0l,⌦ l). Then (N,⌦0, c) 2 C⇤(N, c)(l)m 1 \
C⇤(N, c)(l)m. As (N,⌦0, c) 2 C⇤(N, c)(l)m 1,
'(N,⌦0, c) = 'CEL(N,⌦0, c). (5)
As, for each l0 6= l, ⌦0l0 = ⌦l0 , then by resource monotonicity, for each i 2 N , 'il0(N,⌦, c) =
'il0(N,⌦0, c) and 'CELil0 (N,⌦
0, c) = 'CELil0 (N,⌦, c). Hence, using (5), we obtain: for each l
0 6= l,
'l0(N,⌦, c) = '
CEL
l0 (N,⌦, c). (6)
We only have to show that (6) holds also for l0 = l. As (N,⌦0, c) 2 C⇤(N, c)(l)m, then by (4)
and (5), for each i  m, 'il(N,⌦0, c) = 0. As ⌦0l ⌘
Pn
i=m cil (n m+1)cml   ⌦l (the inequality
holds because (N,⌦, c) 2 C⇤(N, c)(l)m), then by resource monotonicity and non-negativity, for
each i  m, 'il(N,⌦, c) = 0. Hence, by (4), for each i  m, 'il(N,⌦, c) = 'CELil (N,⌦, c).
If m = n   1, then it follows from the above result and the resource constraint that
'nl(N,⌦, c) = 'CELnl (N,⌦, c), completing the proof.
Ifm < n 1, letM ⌘ {1, . . . ,m} and ⌦¯ ⌘ ⌦ Pi2M 'i(N,⌦, c). Consider (N\M, ⌦¯, cN\M).
Note that, for each l0   l + 1 and each i 2 N 'il0(N,⌦, c) = cil0   (
P
j2N cjl0   ⌦l0)/n and
(
P
j2N cjl0   ⌦l0)/n  cil0 . Then, for each i 2 N , (
P
j2N\M cjl0   ⌦¯l0)/(n  m) = (
P
j2N cjl0  
⌦l0)/n  cil0 . Moreover, from (
P
j2N\M cjl   ⌦¯l)/(n   m) = (
P
j2N\M cjl   ⌦l)/(n   m) 
cm+1,l  · · ·  cnl (the first inequality holds because (N,⌦, c) 2 C⇤(N, c)(l)m), it follows that
(N\M, ⌦¯, cN\M) 2 C⇤(l   1). Thus '(N\M, ⌦¯, cN\M) = 'CEL(N\M, ⌦¯, cN\M).
By zero-award-out-consistency, for each i 2 N\M , 'il(N\M, ⌦¯, cN\M) = 'il(N,⌦, c) and
'CELil (N\M, ⌦¯, cN\M) = 'CELil (N,⌦, c). Therefore, for each i   m+1, 'il(N,⌦, c) = 'CELil (N,⌦, c),
completing the proof that (6) holds also for l0 = l.
Remark 1 Let E¯2-agent be the domain of economies with two agents having their claims below
the social endowment, i.e., E¯2-agent = {(N,⌦, c, R) 2 E : |N | = 2 and, for each i 2 N, ci  ⌦},
and C¯2-agent the corresponding claims domain. Note that E¯2-agent ⇢ E⇤ and C¯2-agent ⇢ C⇤. Let
(N,⌦, c) 2 C¯2-agent, and ! ⌘ '(N,⌦, c). Then, if N ⌘ {i, j}, 0 5 ci   !i = ci   [⌦   !j] 5
ci  [cj !j]. Thus, Case 2 in the proof of Lemma 2 never occurs. As that is the only case where
resource monotonicity is used, Lemma 2 and Proposition 3 prevail on E¯2-agent without resource
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monotonicity. Consequently, for this domain, Theorem 2 will hold even without imposing the
two solidarity axioms for the rights-assignment procedure.
We now move to the results in Section 3.3.
Proof of Proposition 4. A simple example of a market-based allocation rule satisfying
relative-no-envy on the whole domain is the rule obtained by composing the proportional rights-
assignment rule and the no-trade exchange rule. To prove the second statement, consider
an exchange economy with two agents and two goods. Let c1 ⌘ (200/3, 100/3) and c2 ⌘
(100/3, 200/3). Let ⌦ ⌘ (100, 100). Preferences are represented by u1 : (x1, x2) ! ↵x1 + x2
and u2 : (x1, x2) !  x1 + x2, with 1/2 < ↵ <   < 2. Then, the set of e cient allocations
is {((0, x2), (100, 100   x2)) : x2 2 [0, 100]} [ {((x1, 100), (100   x1, 0)) : x1 2 [0, 100]}. We
show that no e cient allocation in this economy satisfies relative-no-envy. First, consider
the e cient allocations ((0, x2), (100, 100   x2)) with x2 2 [0, 100]. All these allocations fail
relative-no-envy due to agent 1’s envy. If agent 1 gets the relative compensation of agent 2, her
consumption becomes (2 ⇥ 100, (100   x2)/2). As ↵ > 1/2, then (400↵ + 100)/3 > 100. This
implies x2 < 200↵+ 50  x2/2, which means u1(0, x2) < u1(2⇥ 100, (100  x2)/2), i.e., agent 1
prefers the relative compensation of agent 2 to her own. In the case of e cient allocations
((x1, 100), (100   x1, 0)) with x1 2 [0, 100], using   < 2 and the same argument as above for
agent 2, we can show that they fail relative-no-envy due to agent 2’s envy.
Proof of Theorem 3. The composition of the proportional rule and the no-trade exchange
rule proves that the second statement implies the first statement. In order to prove the converse,
let ' be a rights-assignment that, when composed with an individually rational exchange rule
F , leads to a market-based allocation rule S ⌘ F   ' satisfying relative-no-envy. Suppose, by
contradiction, that there exists (N,⌦, c) 2 C such that ! ⌘ '(N,⌦, c) 6= 'pro(N,⌦, c). Thus,
there exist i, j 2 N , and lˆ 2 {1, . . . , `}, such that !ilˆ > ⌦lˆ · cilˆPh2N chlˆ and !jlˆ < ⌦lˆ · cjlˆPh2N chlˆ . Then
cilˆ > 0, as otherwise the first inequality contradicts claims boundedness. Likewise, cjlˆ > 0, as
otherwise the second inequality contradicts non-negativity. Hence
!ilˆ
cilˆ
>
!jlˆ
cjlˆ
. Then, there exists
a vector of prices p 2 R`++ such that p · (cj ⇥ !ici ) > p · !j. Let e = (N,⌦, c, R) 2 E , where
R is such that Rj is represented by Uj : x ! p · x, Rh is strictly convex for each h 2 N \ {j},
and ! is Pareto e cient at R. Then, ! is the only feasible allocation that satisfies individual
rationality. Hence, ! = F (N,!, R). Now, as p · cj ⇥ !ici > p · !j, agent j envies i’s relative
sacrifice, a contradiction.
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Proof of Proposition 5. Let e ⌘ (N,⌦, c, R) 2 E . For each price p, denote byB(wi(p, c,⌦), p)
the Walrasian budget set given by the income wi(p, c,⌦) ⌘ p·cip·Pj2N cj p · ⌦, i.e.,
B(wi(p, c,⌦), p) = {x 2 R`+ : p · x  wi(p, c,⌦)}.
Let z be a proportional Walrasian equilibrium allocation, i.e., there exists a price p such that,
for each i 2 N , zi 2 B(wi(p, c,⌦), p) and, for each x 2 B(wi(p, c,⌦), p), ziRix.36 Thus, p
supports the indi↵erence set of each i 2 N at zi. Note that
P
i zi = ⌦ and
wi(p, c,⌦)
wj(p, c,⌦)
=
p · ci
p · cj .
This means that agent i can a↵ord the bundle p·cip·cj ⇥ zj. As zi maximizes i’s preference
satisfaction over her budget set,
ziRi p · ci ⇥ zj
p · cj .
Thus, ratio-no-envy is satisfied. Note that e was an arbitrary economy and, thus, no do-
main restrictions were imposed for the proportional Walrasian allocation rule just constructed.
Therefore, we have shown the existence of an allocation rule, defined on the universal domain
of economies, which generates e cient and ratio-envy-free allocations.
We conclude with the proof of Proposition 6 in Section 4.1.
Proof of Proposition 6. For each energy price q, denote by BW ((m¯i, !¯i), q) the Walrasian
budget set given by the endowment of money and energy (m¯i, !¯i), i.e.,
BW ((m¯i, !¯i), q) = {(mi, ei) 2 R2+ : mi + q · ei  m¯i + q · !¯i}.
Similarly, for each pair of energy and permits prices (p, r), denote by BCT ((m¯i, !¯i), (p, r)) the
cap-and-trade budget set given by the endowment of money and permits (m¯i, !¯i), i.e.,
BCT ((m¯i, !¯i), (p, r)) = {(mi, ei) 2 R2+ : mi + (p+ r) · ei  m¯i + r · !¯i}.
Let (m⇤i , e
⇤
i )i2N be an extended cap-and-trade equilibrium allocation with permits assign-
ment (!ei )i2N and transfers (⌧i)i2N . Let  and r
⇤ be the equilibrium prices of energy and permit.
36The existence of proportional Walrasian equilibria is shown by Peleg (1996) and Korthues (2000). They
consider the framework where the total claims of each good may be more or less than the total endowment;
thus, all economies in our model are examples of theirs.
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Let q⇤ ⌘ + r⇤. Then,
BW ((m¯i + ⌧i   !ei ,!ei ), q⇤) = BCT ((m¯i + ⌧i,!ei ), (, r⇤)). (7)
Thus, (m⇤i , e
⇤
i ) maximizes i’s preferences over B
W ((m¯i+ ⌧i !ei ,!ei ), q⇤). The permits market-
clearing condition
P
i2N e
⇤
i = E implies the energy-market clearing and we conclude that
(m⇤i , e
⇤
i )i2N is a Walrasian equilibrium with endowment profile (m¯i+⌧i !ei ,!ei )i2N and energy
price q⇤.
Conversely, let (m⇤i , e
⇤
i )i2N be a Walrasian equilibrium with money-energy endowment profile
(!mi ,!
e
i )i2N and energy price q
⇤. For each i 2 N , let ⌧i ⌘ !mi  m¯i+!ei . Let r⇤ ⌘ q⇤ . Then,
by (7), (m⇤i , e
⇤
i ) maximizes i’s preferences over B
CT ((m¯i+⌧i,!ei ), (, r
⇤)). Finally, it follows from
the market clearing condition for the Walrasian equilibrium that the permits-market clears, i.e.,P
i2N e
⇤
i = E.
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